

**Discussion of
“Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental
Evidence from Costa Rica”
by Anne Brockmeyer, Marco Hernandez,
Stewart Kettle, and Spencer Smith**

**Oscar Mitnik
Inter-American Development Bank**

**10th Annual Meeting Impact Evaluation Network
March 24, 2017**



General comment on the paper

This is a **very nice** paper

- Experiment(s) very well designed and carried out
- Empirical analysis is very careful
- Authors are very thorough and run many robustness checks
- Find very interesting results
- Means from a pure econometric/empirical point of view I do not have much to add

About the research question

There are three compliance dimensions discussed in the paper:

- Intensive margin (“creative accounting”) by formal firms
- Full informality (shadow economy) → extensive margin
- Partial informality (**this paper**) → extensive margin
 - These firms are mostly in the system
 - Many even make quarterly payments!
 - But small expected tax liabilities
- Which should be the group of most interest to tax authorities?

Selection issues

Experiment requires:

- Firm has to be in the “radar” of the tax authorities
- Firm has an email address
(SMS also tried, no effects in terms of tax revenue)
- Firms that show more interesting results are subject to third party reporting \rightarrow of course that's a particular type of firm!
 $\rightarrow \simeq 25\%$ of experiment $\simeq 10\%$ of non-filers $\simeq 3\%$ of firms
- It is important to keep in mind that if a firm can file and be subject to small enough tax bill \rightarrow false sense of increased compliance

About the results

Main results:

- Third-party verification matters: increases filing $\rightarrow \simeq 20$ p.p.
- But probability of net liability increases little ($\simeq 3$ p.p.)
- Increased payments: \simeq US\$15 to US\$19 (US\$0.39 for those with no third-party info)
- Filing results are sustained in medium-term, but what about tax revenue?
- (Minor pet peeve: why so many decimals in the tables?)

Is it worth it for tax authority?

- C-B ratio is 1:5 → pretty good!
- But high organization effort for limited total tax revenue gained....
- So, should tax authorities copy this? Not sure, except...

Understanding mechanisms is key!

- I am not convinced the “nudge” effect is worth the effort
- But learning why this works for some and not for others, and understanding the **mechanisms** by which it works is really important!
- I wish the authors could push that angle more
→ it is not easy!
- Speculation on who are the “compliers”: firms that can easily minimize tax liability?
 - Firms do not underestimate sales/overestimate costs much
 - Authors find some evidence of (declared) $\Delta\text{sales} > \Delta\text{costs}$ (and impacts higher for those with lower sales)
 - So relatively small firms seem to be compelled to file (and pay)

Final thoughts

- This is a very useful paper
 - Nudges matter
 - In an area where getting positive results (increased formality) is hugely important
- But we need “better nudges” → those that affect the firms we really are interested in
- Similar to how discussion around IVs centers on LATE and who are the compliers
- We need more discussion about the type of nudges that could affect the compliers we care about...



 omitnik@iadb.org